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NOTE
The New Red River Rivalry: Oklahoma’s Unconstitutional
Attempt to Calm the Waters by Restricting the Sale of
Water Across State Lines

I. Introduction
In recent years, the need for water has taken an increasingly important
role in states’ quests to meet the expanding drinking, industrial,
agricultural, and recreational needs of their citizens, especially in droughtprone areas of the country such as north Texas.1 To resolve both current and
future water shortage concerns, many states have entered into
congressionally approved water compacts to apportion certain water
resources between neighboring states. However, cities and municipalities,
such as Irving, Texas, are still in dire need of water to meet their
burgeoning projected population growth and are forced to seek additional
supply from areas with excess water supply.2 This has resulted in a largescale competition between various municipalities to acquire any and “all
available water rights within a cost-effective distance.”3 But states are
beginning to fight back against their municipalities, and many are resorting
to controversial and often discriminatory tactics to protect their precious
water resources from being taken by, or even sold to, municipalities in
thirsty neighboring states.

1. E.g., J. Mark McPherson, Why Is Texas So Hot for Oklahoma Water? Because the
Metroplex Is at the Water’s Edge: Let the Wars Begin (article presented at Okla. Water
Env’t Ass’n, Am. Pub. Works Ass’n-Okla. Chapter Annual Meeting, Norman, Okla., Apr. 68, 2009), available at http://www.texash2olaw.com/pdfs/Texas%20v%20OK%20for%20
Water.pdf.
2. See City of Irving, Texas’s First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment &
Injunctive Relief at 2, City of Hugo v. Nichols, No. CIV-08-303-JTM, 2010 WL 1816345
(E.D. Okla. June 2, 2009), 2009 WL 2860901, vacated, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).
Based on 2008 data, the City of Irving had a residential population of 210,150; the
population is expected to reach 298,000 by the year 2100. Id. As a result, Irving’s water
demand is expected to increase from its current usage of approximately forty-three million
gallons per day to over eighty million gallons per day by 2100. Id. However, Irving currently
only has a reliable water supply of forty-six million gallons per day. Id.
3. Nicholas Andrew, Note, Interstate Water Transfers and the Red River Shootout, 41
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 181 (2011).
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In City of Hugo v. Nichols, the City of Irving, Texas, entered into a
contract with the City of Hugo, Oklahoma, to purchase large quantities of
water to meet Irving’s growing demand.4 However, the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board (the Board) denied Hugo’s appropriation applications and
the State of Oklahoma, under the protection of the Red River Compact,
subsequently passed a series of state statutes placing significant burdens on
the sale of water for out-of-state use.5 Hugo and Irving brought suit against
the members of the Board, seeking a declaration that the Oklahoma statutes
governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were “unconstitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause.”6 In 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that political subdivisions, such as cities and
municipalities, lack standing against their parent states to bring suit alleging
a violation of rights under a substantive provision of the United States
Constitution.7 The court upheld the Oklahoma statutes that placed
additional and discriminatory burdens on applicants seeking water
appropriation for out-of-state use (as compared to applicants seeking
appropriation for in-state use) despite the fact that such statutes clearly
seem to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This ruling not only denied
potential revenue, taxes, and investment capital to the State of Oklahoma,
but also prohibited job creation from usage of the water in North Texas.
Additionally, it effectively granted the state power to discriminate in
interstate commerce and deprived an injured political subdivision of a
federal court remedy.
This note explores the application of the political subdivision standing
doctrine in Hugo and the court’s reasoning for denying standing to a party
that seems to be entitled to protection under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Part II provides an overview of the Commerce Clause and the development
of the political subdivision standing doctrine leading up to Hugo. Part III
presents Hugo, including a statement of facts, the procedural history, an
explanation of the majority opinion, and a discussion of the dissenting
opinion. Part IV examines why the court should have found standing
existed under the political subdivision standing doctrine and argues that
Hugo would have prevailed on the merits had standing been found. Part V
discusses the broad consequences of the court’s finding.

4.
5.
6.
7.

City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id. at 1257-58.
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II. Law Leading Up to Hugo
A. The Interstate Commerce Clause
1. An Overview of the Commerce Clause
The Interstate Commerce Clause contains an enumerated power that
vests in Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”8 This clause serves to impede state efforts to unfairly advance their
own state interests at the expense of the national economy and out-of-state
consumers.9 Implicit in this positive grant of authority is the negative, or
dormant, Commerce Clause authority that voids state legislation unduly
burdening interstate commerce, even if Congress has not affirmatively
legislated in the area addressed by state law.10 In effect, the dormant
Commerce Clause is a judicial creation designed to fill the void when
Congress has failed to preserve constitutional limits of power. Thus, the
clause is “dormant” because, although Congress has not legislated in the
area, Supreme Court decisions have effectively created a protected interest
and granted relief, even in the absence of congressional action.11
The purpose of recognizing the dormant Commerce Clause is to prohibit
“economic protectionism,” which the Supreme Court defined as “regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening outof-state competitors.”12 There is a two-step analysis when a state law is
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause. First, a court determines
whether the state regulation discriminates against interstate commerce
either facially or as practically applied.13 If the discrimination is overt on its
face, the state regulation is subject to strict scrutiny and will only be upheld
if it is necessary to the satisfaction of a compelling state end.14 The burden
rests on the state to justify the regulation in terms of the local benefits and
lack of alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.15 A
8. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
9. E.g., New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338-39 (1982).
10. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
11. See generally Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
12. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1994) (quoting New
Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
13. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007).
14. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
15. Id.
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state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce is, therefore,
“virtually per se invalid”16 unless the state can demonstrate the legislation is
“the least discriminatory alternative” to advance a legitimate local
interest.17 Second, if the state statute is nondiscriminatory on its face but is
discriminatory as applied, the court will apply a balancing test called the
“Pike Balancing Test.”18 The test weighs the rule’s local benefit against its
burden on interstate commerce.19 If the burden on interstate commerce is
greater than the local benefit, the state statute is unconstitutional.20
Conversely, if the local benefit is greater than the burden on interstate
commerce, the state statute is constitutional.21
State attempts at economic protectionism are generally unconstitutional
unless they meet one of the exceptions to the Commerce Clause. These
exceptions include discrimination in markets where the state itself is a
participant22 and discriminatory state regulations authorized by Congress.23
One potential method under the latter exception is for Congress to use its
power under the Commerce Clause to “confer[] upon the States an ability to
restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise
enjoy.”24
2. Using the Commerce Clause to Strike Down Restrictive State Laws
The United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have used the
dormant Commerce Clause to strike down state laws burdening interstate
commerce despite state claims of authority through congressional intent.
The dispositive question in these cases has been whether Congress
16. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
17. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38.
18. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
19. Id. The Court declared the general rule was as follows: “Where the statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id. (citing Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
20. Id.
21. Id. The Court went on to determine the limits of the rule by stating:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id.
22. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
23. See New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982).
24. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980).
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authorized the states to impose the specific restrictions at issue. To
determine if the state action was in fact authorized, courts have determined
a degree of congressional intent specificity necessary to survive a
Commerce Clause attack.
Early Supreme Court cases recognized Congress’s power to validate
unconstitutional provisions of state laws as long as “Congress ha[d]
expressly stated its intent and policy.”25 This standard of “expressly stated”
was reaffirmed in New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire when the
Court struck down a state statute and refused to “rewrite its legislation
based on mere speculation as to what Congress ‘probably had in mind.’”26
In that case, the State of New Hampshire argued that the Federal Power Act
passed by Congress granted the state authority to prohibit exportation of
hydroelectric energy generated within its borders.27 However, the Supreme
Court determined that the provision at issue in the Federal Power Act was
not an affirmative grant of authority for the state to violate the Commerce
Clause by restricting the flow of electricity in interstate commerce.28
In the seminal decision of Sporhase v. Nebraska, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that effectively banned the
interstate sale or use of Nebraska groundwater to any states with which it
did not have reciprocal water agreements.29 On appeal, the Court
determined that since water was an article of commerce, the state could
restrict its transfer across state lines if the regulation “evenhandedly”
advanced a legitimate local public interest with only an “incidental” effect
on interstate commerce.30 However, the state’s restriction of groundwater
exportation did not survive this “strictest scrutiny” test because there was
insufficient evidence that the reciprocity requirement significantly
advanced, and was not “narrowly tailored” to, the state’s public interest of
conservation and preservation.31 In response to Nebraska’s claim that the
25. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946).
26. 455 U.S. at 343 (quoting United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295,
319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
27. Id. at 335-36.
28. Id. at 344.
29. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982).
30. Id. at 954 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
31. Id. at 957-58. Sporhase did recognize that “under certain circumstances each State
may restrict water within its borders.” Id. at 956. For instance, a state could favor its own
citizens in a time of shortage or a “demonstrably arid” state could establish that a ban on
exportation was necessary for the purpose of conservation and preservation. Id. at 957-58. In
City of El Paso v. Reynolds, the legitimate public interest test from Sporhase was further
limited to allow a state statute to discriminate against another state’s citizens with respect to
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thirty-seven statutes and interstate compacts deferring to state water law
showed an implication that Congress intended to give permission to place a
burden on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that the compact and
statutory language did not show an intent to remove constitutional
constraints on the pertinent state laws.32 To effectuate the required intent,
the Court held that congressional consent “to the unilateral imposition of
unreasonable burdens on commerce” must be “expressly stated.”33
Just two years after Sporhase, the Court held that congressional intent
was required to be “unmistakably clear” in order “for a state regulation to
be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause.”34 In SouthCentral Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the State of Alaska
imposed a statute that required timber taken from state owned lands to be
processed in state prior to export.35 The Alaska Legislature based its
regulation on a federal statute that imposed the same requirement on timber
from federal lands.36 The Court found that Congress must have
“affirmatively contemplate[d] otherwise invalid state legislation” before
such legislation could violate the dormant Commerce Clause.37 This
requirement for “affirmative contemplation” suggested “the need for a
particular issue to be directly in front of Congress,” thus precluding the
necessary “affirmative contemplation” in the absence of specific language
restricting interstate commerce in the compact.38 By establishing a rule
requiring the clear expression of congressional approval, the Court set out
to protect unrepresented out-of-state interests from being adversely affected
by restraints on commerce from state legislative action.39 Further, the Court
groundwater allocation to the extent that the water in question was essential to human
survival. 563 F. Supp. 379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983), superseded by 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M.
1984); see Andrew, supra note 3, at 187.
32. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958-60.
33. Id. at 960. The Court reaffirmed New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire and
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin in holding, “In the instances in which we have found such
consent, Congress’ intent and policy to sustain state legislation from attack under the
Commerce Clause was expressly stated.” Id. (quoting New Eng. Power Co., 455 U.S. at 343)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
35. Id. at 84.
36. Id. at 84, 88-89.
37. Id. at 91-92.
38. Olen Paul Matthews & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts,
and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 624 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 92. The Court’s policy in creating this rule was based on
representation. If a state was allowed to burden commerce, “the brunt of regulations” would
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refused to infer congressional intent from the fact that the Alaska state
policy was consistent with or possibly even furthered Congress’s goals in
enacting the federal policy.40
3. Limiting the Commerce Clause Through Interstate Compacts
Another potential method to limit the dormant Commerce Clause under
the congressional authorization exception is through the states’ use of
interstate compacts. Interstate compacts are congressionally ratified
agreements between states.41 These compacts are interpreted as federal law
and, as such, are immune from dormant Commerce Clause attacks.42
Compacts can authorize states to act in ways that would otherwise conflict
with the dormant Commerce Clause, such as by placing restrictions on
interstate commerce.43 However, Congress’s consent to a compact “does
not also operate as a kind of blanket approval for state actions under a
compact which otherwise would violate Commerce Clause restrictions.”44
To determine whether a compact between states contains the requisite
congressional intent to preempt constitutional rights, various courts have
applied the “expressly stated,”45 “unmistakably clear,”46 and “affirmatively
contemplate[d]”47 standards to the compact language. Since an interstate
compact becomes federal law upon congressional ratification, the power
derived from an interstate compact by a state to restrict interstate commerce
must also pass this dormant Commerce Clause analysis.48

have a significant effect on citizens from other states not represented in that jurisdiction. Id.
On the other hand, Congress’s actions presented less danger that one state would exploit
citizens of another state because all segments of the country were represented. Id.
40. Id. at 92-93.
41. Matthews & Pease, supra note 38, at 626.
42. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 569-70
(9th Cir. 1985), aff’g 590 F. Supp. 293, 296 (D. Mont. 1983) (per curiam).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 570 (Tashima, J., concurring) (quoting Reply Brief for Appellant at 3).
45. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982) (quoting
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 US. 408, 427 (1946)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
47. Id. at 91-92.
48. Id. (“[F]or a state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant
Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear. The requirement that
Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated by the
policies underlying the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.”); see also Hillside Dairy Inc.
v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003) (“Congress certainly has the power to authorize state
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B. Development of the Political Subdivision Standing Doctrine
In order for a court to undertake this dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the city or municipality must have standing to bring suit in federal
court against its parent state.49 Political subdivisions, such as cities and
municipalities, are created and delegated authority by their parent states.50
Thus, states hold broad powers over their subdivisions. Subdivisions,
however, do not always agree when states exercise this power over them in
ways that conflict with the Constitution or federal law. As a result, the
political subdivision standing doctrine has developed over time to
determine when federal courts retain jurisdiction over controversies
between political subdivisions and their parent states.
1. The Hunter Line of Cases
In an early series of cases at the beginning of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court held that political subdivisions could not sue their parent
states for constitutional violations.51 In the Court’s first political subdivision
doctrine case, Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania
statute authorizing the annexation of the City of Allegheny into the City of
Pittsburgh, despite Allegheny’s claim that the statute violated its citizens’
rights under the Contract Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.52 The Court
concluded that political subdivisions are “created as convenient agencies”
for exercising the powers entrusted to them by the state, so “the State is
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state
regulations that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, but we will not assume
that it has done so unless such an intent is clearly expressed.” (internal citations omitted)).
49. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990) (“It is well established, however,
that before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue.”); see also
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (“[T]his Court has always required that a litigant have ‘standing’ to
challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.”).
50. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. v. City of Camden,
465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984) (noting that a municipality derives its authority from the State);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (“[Political subdivisions] have been
traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the
State . . . .”); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (stating that a
municipality “remains the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges
subject to the sovereign will”).
51. See Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36 (1933); Trenton, 262 U.S. 182; Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
52. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 176-77.
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constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States.”53
The Supreme Court expanded this rule in City of Trenton v. New
Jersey.54 In Trenton, the city challenged its parent state’s imposition of a
fee for withdrawing water from the Delaware River as violating both the
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.55
The Court followed its reasoning from Hunter, holding that a municipal
corporation was a “creature of the state” and the state could “withhold,
grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.”56 The Court
concluded that the State’s authority to grant a political subdivision its
powers prevented the subdivision from bringing the suit:
The power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities
held and used for “governmental purposes” cannot be
questioned. . . . This court has never held that these subdivisions
may invoke such restraints [based on the Contract Clause or
Fourteenth Amendment] upon the power of the state.57
The Court later applied the Trenton rule to hold that a political
subdivision lacked standing to bring an equal protection challenge under the
Fourteenth Amendment against its parent state’s actions.58 In Williams v.
Mayor of Baltimore, the mayor and city council of Baltimore challenged the
validity of a state statute exempting a railroad from local taxes.59 In
rejecting the challenge, the Court explained that “[a] municipal corporation,
created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or
immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition
to the will of its creator.”60

53. Id. at 178-79.
54. See 262 U.S. at 183-84.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 189-90.
57. Id. at 188.
58. See Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933).
59. Id. at 39.
60. Id. at 40 (citing R.R. Comm’n v. L.A. Ry. Corp., 280 U.S. 145 (1929); Risty v. Chi.,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378 (1926); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
192 (1923); Trenton, 262 U.S. 182; City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S.
394 (1919); City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539 (1905)).
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2. Modern Courts’ Interpretation of the Hunter Line of Cases
Despite the broad language in earlier cases, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have shied away from erecting an absolute bar to political
subdivisions challenging the actions of parent states in federal court.61 In
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court explained:
[A] correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter
and kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to
manipulate in every conceivable way, for every conceivable
purpose, the affairs of its municipal corporations, but rather that
the State’s authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions
of the Constitution considered in those cases.62
While Gomillion was not a suit between a municipality and its parent
state, its interpretation of the political subdivision doctrine definitively
limited the application of Hunter, Trenton, and Williams to political
subdivision challenges under the Contract Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment.63 The Court also refused to acknowledge a complete bar to all
suits by political subdivisions against their parent states in finding that
“[l]egislative control of municipalities . . . lies within the scope of relevant
limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.”64
More recently, in Branson School District RE-82 v. Romer, the Tenth
Circuit found standing of a political subdivision in a preemption case and
formulated a test that allows standing if: (1) the political subdivision asserts
a challenge to a state action under a federal constitutional provision written
to protect “collective” or “structural rights”65 and (2) the political
subdivision is “substantially independent” from the parent state.66 The court
read the authoritative line of cases as “stand[ing] only for the limited
proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional challenge
against its creating state when the constitutional provision that supplies the
basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed

61. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
62. Id. at 344.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 344-45. In Gomillion, the African American citizens of Alabama argued that a
redistricting plan violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 340. The Court held that when
“state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right,” such as
the Fifteenth Amendment, the state is not “insulated from federal judicial review.” Id. at 347.
65. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
66. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1998).
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to collective or structural rights.”67 In Branson, three school districts
brought a Supremacy Clause challenge against an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution, alleging that the amendment violated a federal land
trust established by Congress in the Colorado Enabling Act.68 The court
found the Supremacy Clause to be a structural protection and, therefore,
held that the “political subdivision [had] standing to bring a constitutional
claim against its creating state when the substance of its claim relie[d] on
the Supremacy Clause and a putatively controlling federal law.”69
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation in Branson is but one example of how
cases interpreting the rights of political subdivisions have caused confusion
among modern courts and have ultimately led to a split among the circuits.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only jurisdiction that follows a per se
rule that political subdivisions cannot sue their parent states under any
constitutional provision.70 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have joined the
Tenth Circuit in rejecting a per se rule against allowing suits by political
subdivisions,71 while the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have avoided
definitively resolving the issue.72 It is unclear whether the Second Circuit
has adopted a per se rule.73

67. Id. at 628.
68. Id. at 625-27.
69. Id. at 628.
70. See Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999)
(ruling that the political subdivision “lacks standing to bring an action against the state in
federal court—at least to the extent that its action challenges the validity of state regulations
on due process and Supremacy Clause grounds”); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth.
v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. 1998) (reiterating its interpretation of the Hunter
line of cases as a per se bar to municipal suits against their parent states).
71. See Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564, 567 n.6 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“Although some circuits have followed a per se rule that political subdivisions
may not sue their parent states under any constitutional provision, that is not the rule in this
circuit.”); United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[N]o per se rule
applies in this Circuit.”).
72. See City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 57 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.
1995) (noting that the political subdivision standing doctrine is “unclear”); Amato v.
Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 755 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Judicial support for [a per se] rule may be
waning with time.”); S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Twp. of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 504
(6th Cir. 1986) (“There may be occasions in which a political subdivision is not prevented,
by virtue of its status as a subdivision of the state, from challenging the constitutionality of
state legislation.”).
73. Compare City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that political subdivisions could not challenge a state statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment), with Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding
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III. City of Hugo v. Nichols: Tenth Circuit Denies Standing to a Political
Subdivision Bringing a Commerce Clause Claim
In 2011 the Tenth Circuit heard another political subdivision standing
doctrine case in City of Hugo v. Nichols.74 This time, however, the dispute
involved a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to various state statutes
passed under the protection of an interstate compact.75
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1955 Congress granted Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana
permission to negotiate an interstate compact to equitably apportion the
stream waters of the Red River and its tributaries.76 Twenty-three years
later, the states approved the Red River Compact (the Compact) to divide
the Red River and its tributaries for purposes of water apportionment
between the four participating states.77 Shortly thereafter, Congress gave its
consent and the compact became federal law in 1980.78
Accordingly, the Compact resulted in the Oklahoma Legislature enacting
a series of statutes designed to prevent or restrict the exportation of
Oklahoma stream water.79 The initial legislation included a now expired
moratorium on the sale of water outside of the state, as well as several
antitrade statutes designed to prevent Oklahoma residents from selling
Oklahoma stream water to nonresidents.80 However, the statutes at issue in
Hugo were enacted in 2009 and further prevented and burdened the transfer
that a city “had no standing to assert constitutional claims,” but noting that a political
subdivision might have standing to assert a claim under the Fifth Amendment).
74. See 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).
75. Id. at 1254.
76. City of Hugo v. Nichols, No. CIV-08-303-JTM, 2010 WL 1816345, at *2 (E.D.
Okla. April 30, 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).
77. Id.
78. Id. The Red River Compact was part of Public Law No. 96-564. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Oklahoma Moratorium expired on November 1, 2009, five years from its
effective date. Id. The antitrade provisions still in effect include: (1) 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.16(B) (2011) (providing that surface water appropriations not fully utilized within seven
years of authorization would be approved only if the proposed use would promote the
beneficial use of water in Oklahoma), (2) 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.2(2) (prohibiting the Board
from making a contract to convey title or use water outside of Oklahoma without
authorization from the Oklahoma legislature), and (3) 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1085.22
(prohibiting the Board from permitting the sale or resale of any water for use outside the
state). Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *2; see also Joint Brief of All Appellants at 14-15, City
of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-7043, 10-7044), 2010 WL
3736199, at *4.
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of Oklahoma stream water for out-of-state use.81 These recent enactments
(collectively, the Oklahoma statutes): (1) impose additional restrictions on
permits to be issued by the Board for use of water outside of Oklahoma,82
(2) require legislative approval of permits for the out-of-state use of water
apportioned to Oklahoma under an interstate compact,83 (3) require the
Board to determine whether water subject to a permit application for out-ofstate use can be transported to alleviate shortages in the state,84 and (4)
subject permits granted by the Board for out-of-state use to a review by the
Board every ten years to determine if there has been a change in the water
needs and availability in Oklahoma.85
Prior to the enactment of the recent statutes, the City of Hugo86 and City
of Irving87 entered into a contract whereby Hugo would sell, and Irving
would purchase, substantial quantities of Oklahoma stream water
appropriated under the Compact to Hugo from the Kiamichi River.88 At
contract formation, Hugo held two stream water permits issued by the
Board.89 Hugo’s 1954 permit provided an appropriation of 1700 acre-feet of
stream water per year and its 1972 permit authorized the appropriation of
28,800 acre-feet of stream water per year.90 A third application was filed
with the Board in 2002 requesting appropriation of an additional 200,000
acre-feet of stream water from the Kiamichi River per year.91 The Board,
however, did not rule on either the third application or on petitions filed in
November 2008 “to change the place of use for the 1954 and 1972
permits,” as rulings would require consideration of the Oklahoma statutes
challenged by Hugo and Irving.92 Hugo and Irving thereafter brought suit
against the members of the Board,93 seeking a declaration that the relevant
81. Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *5-6.
82. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 105.12A(B)(1) (2011).
83. Id. § 105.12A(D).
84. Id. § 105.12(A)(5).
85. Id. § 105.12(F).
86. The City of Hugo is an Oklahoma municipality located in Choctaw County,
Oklahoma. Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *1.
87. The City of Irving is a Texas municipality located in Dallas County, Texas. Id.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The Oklahoma Water Resources Board is an Oklahoma state agency consisting of
nine individual members responsible for enforcing the laws enacted by Oklahoma regarding
the appropriation and use of the surface waters of Oklahoma. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656
F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011).
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Oklahoma laws governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and requesting an injunction
prohibiting their enforcement.94
On April 30, 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma granted the Board’s cross-motion for summary
judgment in part, as to plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claims,95 and denied it
in part.96 The district court held that Congress’s approval of the Compact
language was sufficient to protect the Oklahoma statutes from a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.97 In doing so, the court determined that
Congress’s ratification of the Compact authorized Oklahoma to enact the
contested statutes to control waters within its borders.98
The case was subsequently appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals on May 28, 2010.99 On appeal, neither party raised the issue of
whether the court had jurisdiction.100 However, the “court ordered the
parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing” the issue of standing for
each appellant to bring suit against the Board.101

94. Hugo, 2010 WL 1816345, at *2.
95. Id. at *7.
96. Id. The district court denied defendants’ summary judgment argument that the case
should be dismissed “on grounds of mootness due to recent legislation or based on any need
to defer to the Compact Commission, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Notice of Appeal at 1, City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 10-7043, 10-7044).
100. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1255. Despite the fact that the district court exercised jurisdiction
and neither party contested the standing issue on appeal, the court exercised its “obligation
to assess its own jurisdiction” and determine if the appellants met the standing requirements
of Article III of the United States Constitution. Id. (citing Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
631 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2011)).
101. Id. In an order filed on June 14, 2011, the parties were ordered to file supplemental
briefs to address two issues:
1. Whether City of Hugo has standing to sue the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board under the political subdivision standing doctrine as described
in Branson School District [RE-82] v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998).
2. If this court concludes City of Hugo does not have standing to sue,
whether City of Hugo’s lack of standing impacts City of Irving’s standing.
Order at 2, Hugo, 656 F.3d 1251 (Nos. 10-7043, 10-7044).
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B. Majority Opinion
In a 2-1 decision,102 the Tenth Circuit held that Hugo, as “a political
subdivision of Oklahoma, lack[ed] standing to sue the Board under the
dormant Commerce Clause.”103 As a result, Irving also lacked standing
because “Irving’s standing [was] premised solely on its contract with
Hugo” and therefore Irving’s alleged injury could not be redressed by the
relief requested.104 Thus, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order
and remanded the case to the district court to be dismissed for lack of
federal jurisdiction.105
The Tenth Circuit began its discussion with a brief history of the political
subdivision standing doctrine dating back to Trenton and the subsequent
development of the doctrine in Williams, Gomillion, and Branson.106 In
acknowledging “the broad language in these earl[ier] cases,” the court
noted that the Supreme Court and circuit courts “have shied away from
erecting an absolute bar to political subdivisions asserting rights against
their parent states in federal court.”107 In support, the court pointed towards
Gomillion as limiting the state’s unrestrained authority as against its
political subdivisions only by the particular constitutional prohibitions
considered in Trenton (Contract and Due Process Clauses) and Williams
(Fourteenth Amendment).108 The court agreed with Gomillion and was
unwilling to “grant[] the states ‘plenary power to manipulate in every
conceivable way . . . the affairs of municipal corporations.’”109
Instead, the court shifted its focus to the holding in Branson that granted
“federal jurisdiction over a political subdivision’s claim brought under a
federal statute as a Supremacy Clause claim.”110 The court interpreted
Branson as making the limited distinction that a political subdivision could
not sue its parent state for a constitutional violation if the subject provision
was written to protect “individual rights.”111 Rather, Branson held that a
102. Judge Murphy authored the majority opinion, with Judge Gorsuch joining. See
Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1253. Judge Matheson issued the dissenting opinion. Id. at 1265
(Matheson, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1254 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 1254, 1265.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1255-56.
107. Id. at 1256.
108. Id.
109. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
344 (1960)).
110. Id. (citing Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998)).
111. Id. (quoting Branson, 161 F.3d at 628) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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political subdivision could only bring a constitutional challenge under a
“constitutional provision[] designed to protect ‘collective or structural
rights’ (i.e. the Supremacy Clause).”112 The court therefore maintained that
Branson should simply be read as ruling “that Trenton and Williams do not
bar suits by municipalities against their parent states to enforce, via the
Supremacy Clause, the provisions of federal statutes conferring rights on
those very municipalities.”113
With the Branson rule in mind, the court subsequently examined the
findings of standing in Branson and Kaw Tribe that claimed Supremacy
Clause violations and compared them to the dormant Commerce Clause
claim in the present case.114 In its analysis, the court determined that the
states in both prior cases asserted a new state law or conducted actions in
such a way as to conflict with a federal statute.115 In these cases, the
Supremacy Clause was “not a source of any federal rights.”116 Instead, the
sources of substantive rights originally given to the political subdivisions
were congressionally enacted federal statutes “and the Supremacy Clause
was invoked merely to guarantee, as a structural matter, that federal law
predominate[d] over conflicting state law.”117 On the other hand, the court
determined that “[t]he dormant Commerce Clause . . . itself provide[d]
substantive rights” to a party in that it directly conferred power to the
federal government and “limit[ed] the states’ ability to act in certain
ways.”118 Therefore, claims brought under the Commerce Clause do not fit
into the court’s interpretation of “collective or structural.”119
Ultimately, the court concluded that Hugo lacked standing under
Branson because the dormant Commerce Clause claim was “based on a
substantive provision of the Constitution, and . . . the Supreme Court ha[d]
made clear that the Constitution [did] not contemplate the rights of political
subdivisions as against their parent states.”120 In doing so, the court
affirmed the rule that a political subdivision could only sue its parent state

112. Id. (quoting Branson, 161 F.3d at 628).
113. Id. at 1260-61. See generally Hous. Auth. of Kaw Tribe of Indians v. City of Ponca
City, 952 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979).
114. See Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1256-58.
115. Id. at 1256-57.
116. Id. at 1256 (quoting Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. at 1257.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 1257-58.
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“when Congress has enacted statutory law specifically providing rights to
[political subdivisions].”121
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Matheson disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of Branson and its finding that Hugo lacked standing.122
Judge Matheson argued that “the dormant Commerce Clause protect[ed] a
structural right and thereby support[ed] political subdivision standing.”123 In
his argument, Judge Matheson highlighted two problems with the
majority’s analysis. First, the majority interpreted Branson as a narrow
exception to the limited political subdivision standing doctrine of the early
cases.124 Judge Matheson, on the other hand, interpreted Branson as a
broader exception and method to determine if a claim fit within the
structural rights category.125 Second, the majority’s holding effectively
limited a structural rights claim under Branson to only include a preemption
claim.126 Judge Matheson argued that claims under the dormant Commerce
Clause also fell into the structural rights category.127
As a resolution to the first problem, Judge Matheson argued that while
“Branson granted political subdivision standing on a federal preemption
claim, [the Tenth Circuit did not declare] that a political subdivision could
sue its parent state only for a preemption claim” as was maintained by the
majority.128 Rather, Judge Matheson read Branson to “recognize[] a broader
exception that [allowed] future consideration of claims based on
constitutional provisions written to protect structural rights.”129 Instead of
limiting the political subdivision standing doctrine to only the specific
constitutional claims presented in cases from Trenton to Branson, the court
was required to determine if “the constitutional provision that supplie[d] the
basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed
to collective or structural rights.”130 Judge Matheson further reasoned that if
the Branson court intended to limit its holding to only preemption claims,
121. Id. at 1257.
122. Id. (Matheson, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1266.
124. Id. at 1269-70.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1270-73.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1270.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the court’s “distinction between individual and structural rights would be
superfluous.”131
Based on this understanding of Branson, Judge Matheson next attacked
the majority’s determination that the dormant Commerce Clause was not
based on a structural right.132 In contrast to the majority’s comparison
between a preemption claim and a dormant Commerce Clause claim, Judge
Matheson argued that “[d]ormant Commerce Clause claims are more like
preemption than individual rights claims because they concern the relative
power of federal and state government.”133 Judge Matheson defined a
preemption claim as one “alleg[ing] that a federal statute is supreme . . . to
conflicting state law. [Thus it] is structural because it concerns the relative
authority of federal and state government.”134 In contrast, Judge Matheson
defined “[a]n individual right claim” as one “concern[ing] the limits of
government authority over the individual.”135 Therefore, according to Judge
Matheson, dormant Commerce Clause claims should be considered
structural rights “because they concern the relative power of federal and
state government” by asking whether a state law unconstitutionally
inhibited interstate commerce, and thus, “was ‘written to protect’ the
allocation of power between the federal government and states,” not
individual rights.136
Judge Matheson further argued that Hugo also met the second
requirement of the political subdivision doctrine in Branson—that “a
political subdivision be ‘substantially independent’ from its parent state to
have standing.”137 Similar to the school districts in Branson, Hugo was
substantially independent of its parent state because it could “hold property
in its own name, enter into contracts, and sue and be sued in its own
name.”138 As a result, “[b]ecause Hugo raised a claim based on a
constitutional provision that protect[ed] structural rights” and was
independent of its parent state, Judge Matheson would have held that Hugo
had standing and that the court should have reached a decision on the
merits.139
131. Id. at 1271.
132. See id. at 1270-75.
133. Id. at 1272.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1272-73.
137. Id. at 1275.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1265, 1275. It is important to note that Judge Matheson found Irving had
standing even if Hugo did not because the political subdivision doctrine did not apply to
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IV. Analysis
A. The Majority Misinterpreted Precedential Case Law and Should Have
Found Standing Existed Under the Political Subdivision Doctrine
In Hugo, the majority and the dissent came to strikingly different
opinions. While both opinions agreed that early political subdivision
standing doctrine cases took a strict, absolutist view of a political
subdivision’s ability to sue its parent state, the judges parted ways when
interpreting Branson.140 The majority ignored the important Branson
distinction between individual and structural rights, choosing instead to
interpret Branson as creating a limited exception to the strict early views for
claims brought under the Supremacy Clause.141 In contrast, Judge Matheson
correctly interpreted Branson as recognizing a broader exception that
establishe[d] a framework to “allow future consideration of claims [brought
under] constitutional provisions written to protect structural rights.”142 The
issue therefore hinges on the application of the Branson framework to
determine whether the dormant Commerce Clause protects individual or
structural rights.
1. Interpretation of Branson
The Hugo majority read Branson as standing for the limited proposition
that a political subdivision can sue its parent state only if suit was brought
under a preemption claim.143 In doing so, the court mistakenly held that the
Branson court’s use of the terms “collective” and “structural” referred only
to a situation where a political subdivision brought suit against its parent
state under a federal statute through the Supremacy Clause.144 This
understanding resulted in a political subdivision only having standing to sue
its parent state when Congress had directly conferred upon the subdivision

Irving. Id. at 1265. Furthermore, “Irving . . . asserted a justiciable claim” against the Board
because the Oklahoma water statutes interfered with its contract with Hugo and its only
remedy would be “a favorable ruling on its dormant Commerce Clause challenge.” Id. at
1265, 1275-76. For additional discussion on the “justiciable” requirement of a claim, see
Alexander Willscher, The Justiciability of Municipal Preemption Challenges to State Law,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (2000).
140. Compare Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1256 (majority opinion), with id. at 1266 (Matheson, J.,
dissenting).
141. See id. at 1261 (majority opinion).
142. Id. at 1270 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1257 (majority opinion).
144. Id.
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a specific right and the parent state had denied it the benefit of that right in
violation of the federal law.
The majority reasoned that, in Branson, “[T]he source of substantive
rights was a federal statute specifically directed at protecting political
subdivisions, and the Supremacy Clause was” used to structurally guarantee
that the federal law preempted the challenged state law.145 In contrast, it
held in Hugo that the dormant Commerce Clause, not a federal statute,
directly provided substantive rights to the political subdivision.146 Thus, the
dormant Commerce Clause did not meet the limited exception from
Branson that only allowed suits “when Congress [had] enacted statutory
law specifically providing rights to” the political subdivision that
contradicted state actions.147
However, a more accurate reading of Branson recognizes a broader
exception to the political subdivision standing doctrine that allows standing
for claims based on constitutional provisions written to protect “structural”
rights. Rather than specifically limiting political subdivision standing to
certain preemption claims, the Branson court expanded on the early cases to
block standing only when the “constitutional provision that supplies the
basis for the complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed
to collective or structural rights.”148 Thus, a political subdivision has
standing to sue its parent state in federal court if (1) the nature of its legal
challenge to a state action was under a federal constitutional provision
written to protect “collective” or “structural” rights, rather than individual
rights; and (2) the political subdivision is “substantially independent” from
its parent state.149
As Judge Matheson argued, if, as the majority held, Branson intended to
restrict political subdivision standing to preemption claims under the
Supremacy Clause, the Branson court’s distinction between individual and
structural rights would have been irrelevant.150 Therefore, in order to
determine if Hugo has standing we must first determine whether Hugo’s
dormant Commerce Clause claim is based on a structural or individual
right.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 629.
Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1271 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
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2. Structural v. Individual Rights
It is evident from the Branson court’s interpretation of Hunter, Trenton,
and Williams that the Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal
Protection Clause all fall into the individual rights category of the Branson
test.151 It is further made apparent that the Supremacy Clause protects a
structural right.152 However, the Branson court did not provide much
additional guidance for distinguishing between a constitutional provision
“written to protect” an individual right and one “written to protect” a
structural right.153
The courts have described a structural right as one that “establishes a
structure of government which defines the relative powers of the state and
the federal government.”154 By contrast, an individual right claim concerns
the limits of government authority over an individual or the relationship
between the state and the private market.155 Other courts have described
individual rights as those that “confer fundamental rights on individual
citizens” and “guarantee[] that all citizens enjoy equal protection of the
laws and due process of law.”156
While Branson did not elaborate on its distinction between structural and
individual rights, the Branson court did provide an example of a structural
right by declaring that a preemption claim under the Supremacy Clause was
structural in nature.157 A preemption claim alleges that a federal statute is
supreme to, or preempts, a conflicting state law.158 This type of “claim is
structural because it concerns the relative authority [between] federal and
state government.”159
Dormant Commerce Clause claims also concern the relative powers of
the federal and state governments by claiming that a state law
unconstitutionally interferes with the federal regulation of interstate

151. See Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); City of Trenton v. New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 176-77 (1907).
152. See Branson, 161 F.3d at 628-29.
153. Id. at 628.
154. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 958 F. Supp. 1501, 1507-08 (D. Colo. 1997)
(quoting San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (S.D. Cal.
1978)), aff’d, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998).
155. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1260 (majority opinion).
156. Branson, 958 F. Supp. at 1507 (quoting Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. at 289-90) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
157. Branson, 161 F.3d at 629.
158. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1272 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
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commerce.160 As an enumerated power of Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution, the Commerce Clause, upon which the dormant Commerce
Clause is based, was written to protect states’ rights by authorizing and
limiting the powers of Congress, and allocating power between the federal
government and the states.161 The Supreme Court has described the
Commerce Clause as “a self-executing limitation on the power of the States
to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.”162 One
leading commentator stated that “[t]he Fifth and Tenth Circuits . . . have
limited cities’ standing to cases that involve claims under the Supremacy
Clause and other structural restrictions on state power, such as the Dormant
Commerce Clause.”163 Accordingly, claims based on this provision, such as
the one in Hugo, ask courts to resolve questions of relative federal and state
power. Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause is a structural right that,
similar to the Supremacy Clause, acts as a substantive limitation on the
states’ governmental power in relation to the federal government.
Therefore, it meets the first part of the Branson test to determine if a
political subdivision has standing to challenge unconstitutional state
actions.
3. Hugo’s Independence
According to Branson, in addition to making a claim based on a
structural right, a political subdivision must also be “substantially
independent” from its parent state in order to have standing.164 This is
necessary so that the suit does not amount to the state essentially suing
itself. In this case, “The City of Hugo is substantially independent of [the
State of] Oklahoma.”165 “Hugo can hold property in its own name, enter
into contracts, . . . sue and be sued,” obtain property by eminent domain,
and engage in activity for the benefit of its citizens.166 Therefore, Hugo also
meets the second part of the political subdivision doctrine test.

160. Id. at 1273.
161. Id. at 1272-73 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
105-08 (2005)).
162. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984).
163. David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution,
115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2250 (2006) (emphasis added).
164. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1998).
165. Hugo, 656 F.3d at 1275 (Matheson, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (citing 11 OKLA. STAT. §§ 22-101, 22-104, 37-117 (2011)).
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4. The Court Should Have Found Standing Existed
A political subdivision that is substantially independent of its parent state
has standing under the political subdivision standing doctrine to challenge a
statute passed by its parent state under a constitutional provision that was
written to protect structural or collective rights.167 As established above,
Hugo is substantially independent of the State of Oklahoma and has
challenged various Oklahoma statutes under the dormant Commerce
Clause, which acts as a structural limitation on the state regulation of
interstate commerce. Hugo, therefore, had standing to bring its dormant
Commerce Clause challenge, and the court should have proceeded to reach
a decision as to whether the Oklahoma statutes unconstitutionally violated
the Commerce Clause.
B. Upon Finding Standing, the Court Should Strike Down Oklahoma’s
Statutes as Unconstitutional
The Commerce Clause vests Congress with the enumerated and
exclusive power to regulate commerce between states.168 Implicit in this
grant of authority is the dormant Commerce Clause, which voids state
attempts to unduly burden interstate commerce even if Congress has not
affirmatively legislated in the area addressed by the state law.169 States are
therefore prohibited from unfairly advancing their own state interests at the
expense of the national economy by giving their own citizens an advantage
over out-of-state citizens.170 However, congressional ratification of an
interstate compact may authorize states to act in ways that would otherwise
conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause, such as by placing undue
burdens on out-of-state parties.171 Once Congress approves an interstate
compact, the compact becomes federal law and the constitutionality of state
action hinges on whether Congress’s intent in approving the interstate
compact is sufficiently clear.172
The Supreme Court has determined the degree of specificity of
congressional intent required for a state to have the authority to violate the
Commerce Clause.173 In Sporhase, the Supreme Court announced that the
167. Branson, 161 F.3d at 628-29; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
168. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
169. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
170. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1994).
171. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 569-70
(9th Cir. 1985).
172. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
173. See discussion supra Part II.
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standard for determining congressional intent to authorize state restrictions
on interstate commerce is that such authorization must be “expressly
stated.”174 Subsequent decisions of the Court expanded the standard to also
include congressional intent that is “unmistakably clear.”175 This high level
of specificity requires interstate compacts, such as the Red River Compact,
to contain very specific language in order to meet the Sporhase standard
and survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.176
1. Applying Sporhase and Wunnicke to the Red River Compact
While there is no doubt that Congress approved the state-negotiated Red
River Compact, the Compact does not explicitly prohibit the export of
water or even make reference to the Commerce Clause.177 Congressional
consent to the Compact was simply limited to “an equitable apportionment
among [the compacting states] of the waters of the Red River and its
tributaries.”178 Sporhase established that an equitable apportionment does
not in itself demonstrate the required specificity of congressional intent to
authorize a waiver of Commerce Clause restrictions.179 The leading
commentators reviewing Sporhase have also agreed, with one major treatise
summarizing the holding by noting: “In other words, Congress’ mere
consent to the water compacts was not an unmistakably clear expression of
intent to authorize unreasonable state burdens on commerce.”180 Thus, the
congressional authorization to negotiate the Compact and congressional
ratification of the Compact do not provide the requisite “expressly stated”
or “unmistakably clear” expression of congressional intent necessary to
authorize violations of the Commerce Clause.
Like the Compact, most interstate water compacts in the western United
States remain silent on transfer rights of the signatory parties, but courts
have found that some compacts satisfy the Sporhase standard in prohibiting
174. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982) (quoting New Eng.
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
176. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959.
177. See Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, art. IV, § 4.02(b), 94 Stat. 3305
(1980).
178. Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 84-1444, at 1 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2946,
1955 WL 3984.
179. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958.
180. Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, in 3 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 48.03(c)(6) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2012); see Matthews & Pease,
supra note 38, at 635; Chris Seldin, Comment, Interstate Marketing of Indian Water Rights:
The Impact of the Commerce Clause, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1545, 1555 (1999).
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transfers. For instance, the Snake River Compact between Wyoming and
Idaho states:
No water of the Snake River shall be diverted in Wyoming for
use outside the drainage area of the Snake River except with the
approval of Idaho; and no water of any tributary of the Salt River
heading in Idaho shall be diverted in Idaho for use outside the
drainage area of said tributary except with the approval of
Wyoming.181
Similarly, the Oregon-California Goose Lake Interstate Compact declares:
“Export of water from Goose Lake Basin for use outside the basin without
prior consent of both State legislatures is prohibited.”182 The KansasNebraska Big Blue River Compact includes the provision: “Neither State
shall authorize the exportation from the Big Blue River of water originating
within that basin without the approval of the [compact agency’s]
administration.”183 Finally, the Yellowstone River Compact provides: “No
water shall be diverted from the Yellowstone River Basin without the
unanimous consent of all the signatory States.”184
The aforementioned interstate compact provisions go far beyond the
simple allocation of stream water—they explicitly authorize states to
restrict or forbid interstate water transfers. This type of express language
constitutes “unmistakably clear” congressional approval of the signatory
states’ ability to avoid the otherwise applicable Commerce Clause
restrictions and therefore meets the Sporhase standard of specificity.
By contrast, the Red River Compact is merely an allocation of interstate
waters and does not come close to authorizing the State of Oklahoma to
forbid or burden the exportation of water by a political subdivision. In
Hugo, the State of Oklahoma argued that the Compact language grants it
“free and unrestricted use”185 of the state’s allocated water and that nothing
in the Compact shall “[i]nterfere with or impair the right or power of any
Signatory State to regulate within its boundaries the appropriation, use, and

181. Snake River Compact, ch. 73, art. IV, 64 Stat. 29, 31 (1950).
182. Goose Lake Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 98-334, art. III(C), 98 Stat. 291, 292
(1984).
183. Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, Pub. L. No. 92-308, art. V, § 5.4, 86
Stat. 193, 197 (1972).
184. Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 231, art. X, 65 Stat. 663, 669 (1951).
185. Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, art. IV, § 4.02(b), 94 Stat. 3305, 3309
(1980).
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control of water.”186 While this Compact language could refer to the use of
water free from constitutional limitations, as the State would contend, it
more likely refers to the use of water free from downstream delivery
obligations. Regardless, the ambiguity of the Compact’s language is
evidence that the Compact does not have “expressly stated” or
“unmistakably clear” limitations on the exportation of water. By failing to
meet this standard, Congress could not possibly have “affirmatively
contemplated” a potential burden on interstate commerce when it ratified
the Compact. The states are thus free and unrestricted in their use and
regulation of the water appropriated under the Compact, so long as their
actions are constitutional.
While Congress may authorize state-imposed restrictions on interstate
commerce through its approval of interstate compacts, the Compact
provides no such authorization. Without specific language in the compact
banning the exportation of water, Congress has not consented to a state
violation of the Commerce Clause. As a result, the State of Oklahoma does
not have the authority to place undue burdens on the exportation of water
and the court must determine if the challenged Oklahoma statutes can
survive the applicable constitutional level of review.
2. Oklahoma Statutes Fail Strict Scrutiny
Since the Compact does not insulate the Oklahoma statutes from the
dormant Commerce Clause, the court must apply Commerce Clause
scrutiny to determine if the statutes are constitutional. The Oklahoma
statutes at issue obviously do not regulate evenhandedly. While they do not
strictly forbid water export, they do impose burdens on parties seeking to
appropriate water for use outside of Oklahoma that are not imposed on
parties seeking to appropriate water for in-state use. This facial
discrimination means that the statutes are subject to strict scrutiny and will
only be upheld as constitutional if they are deemed to be necessary to the
satisfaction of a compelling state end.187
The Court has thus far identified only one compelling end in its interstate
water compact jurisprudence. In Sporhase, the Court held that a state could
favor its own citizens in times of “severe shortage” if necessary for
186. Id. art. II, § 2.10(a), 94 Stat. at 3307. See generally Defendants’ Response to
Supplemental Joint Motion of Plaintiffs City of Hugo and Hugo Municipal Authority, and
Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Irving for Summary Judgment at 13, City of Hugo v. Nichols,
No. CIV-08-303-JTM, 2010 WL 1816345 (E.D. Okla. June 2, 2009), 2008 WL 7328645,
vacated, 656 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).
187. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
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conservation and preservation.188 Studies published by the Board, however,
showed that the State of Oklahoma only uses a small percentage of the
available stream water of the Kiamichi River it has been appropriated under
the Compact.189 The Board also reported that “fourteen times more stream
water flows out of Oklahoma during a given year (36 million acre-feet) than
is actually allocated for annual use in the state (2.6 million acre-feet).”190 In
sum, Oklahoma has an abundant supply of stream water and is in no danger
of a “severe shortage” in the foreseeable future. Instead, the Oklahoma
statutes at issue in Hugo were enacted as a protectionist measure designed
to further the state’s economic interest at the expense of the economic
interest of neighboring states such as Texas.191 As a result of these blatantly
economic protectionist motives and the lack of projected “severe shortage”
of water supply, Oklahoma does not have a compelling end to justify its
discriminatory behavior.
Even if Oklahoma was able to show a water shortage or convince the
court that conservation and preservation of Oklahoma water is a compelling
end, the Oklahoma statutes would still fail the strict scrutiny test because
they are not narrowly tailored or even necessary to protect the compelling
end. In order to qualify as “necessary” under strict scrutiny, the means
taken to satisfy the compelling end must be the least discriminatory
alternative.192 If, in fact, the true purpose of the Oklahoma statutes was to
protect Oklahoma citizens from a water shortage, the Oklahoma statutes
would apply with equal force to all permits to appropriate Oklahoma water,
whether the end use was in state or out of state. This type of evenhanded
regulation would be a far less discriminatory manner to accomplish a goal
of conservation and preservation. As currently written, however, the
Oklahoma statutes do not survive the strict scrutiny test and, therefore, the
burden placed on interstate commerce by the statutes make them
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

188. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982).
189. Joint Brief of All Appellants, supra note 80, at 4.
190. Id.
191. Supplemental Joint Motion of Plaintiffs City of Hugo and Hugo Municipal
Authority, and Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Irving for Summary Judgment and Brief in
Support at 24, City of Hugo v. Nichols, 2010 WL 1816345 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2009) (No.
CIV-08-303-RAW), 2009 WL 5134334.
192. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); see also
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38.
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V. Broad Implications of the Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Hugo effectively provides states the
ability to govern as they please under the protection of an interstate
compact, without regard to constitutional limitations. Political subdivisions
should be allowed to protect themselves against their parent states; but, by
holding that a political subdivision lacks standing to bring suit against its
parent state, the court has removed the only party able to hold the state
accountable for its unconstitutional behavior. As a result, the State is
essentially able to implement unconstitutional actions, such as excessively
burdening the export of water, and then claim that its political subdivision
does not have the right to challenge the state action under federal law.
Further, due to the court’s avoidance of a decision on the merits in Hugo,
the challenged Oklahoma statutes governing stream water remain in force
under Oklahoma law. If these statutes continue unchanged, they will have a
major effect on Oklahoma water law.193 First, Oklahoma water is now
effectively divided into two classes: groundwater, which is subject to
Commerce Clause restrictions, and stream water, which is not.194 This
distinction means that a party can appropriate groundwater for sale across
the state’s border, but is precluded from appropriating stream water for the
same purpose.195
Additionally, the continued allowance of the Oklahoma statutes to place
a discriminatory burden on out-of-state water transfers may spark
neighboring states, or perhaps the entire western United States, to enact
similar discriminatory laws designed to keep each state’s stream water
exclusively for use by its citizens.196 Unrestrained by the dormant
Commerce Clause, many more states would likely take action in order to
gain considerable economic advantages by hoarding their water supplies for
in-state use. This response could significantly hinder economic and
population growth in water-poor states, encourage inefficient use of stream
water in states with an abundance of water, and lead to catastrophic results
for states experiencing a severe water shortage.
Finally, if future courts continue to disregard the “expressly stated” or
“unmistakably clear” standard of congressional approval, virtually all

193. Dale E. Cottingham & Patrick R. Wyrick, Changes to Oklahoma Water Law
Perhaps on the Horizon, GABLE GOTWALS (2010), http://www.gablelaw.com/news_
resources/2010/changes_to_oklahoma_water_law.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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existing interstate water compacts would effectively authorize states to
impose otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on the export of water
apportioned under those compacts. A conclusion of this magnitude is
directly inapposite to the Supreme Court’s holding in Sporhase and the
public policy underlying it.197
On the other hand, if the discriminatory Oklahoma statutes are rightfully
struck down, all parties to the water export would benefit. The City of Hugo
plans to use all of the proceeds from the sale of water for various municipal
purposes that will favor the health, safety, and protection of its citizens.198
The City of Irving will likewise benefit from the sale by ensuring that its
water supply is sufficient to meet the projected water demand increase of its
citizens over the next one hundred years in a fiscally responsible manner.199
Furthermore, these benefits will be realized for both parties without
adversely affecting the water supply or availability for the City of Hugo or
the State of Oklahoma.
VI. Conclusion
While Oklahoma and Texas have been feuding on the college football
gridiron for over one hundred years in the annual Red River Rivalry,200 the
battle for water is just beginning. In addition to Hugo, the Tenth Circuit
recently ruled that the Red River Compact insulated the Oklahoma statutes
from a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in Tarrant Regional Water
District v. Herrmann.201 However, the Tarrant court did not address
whether the Oklahoma statutes would be constitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause if not protected by the Compact.202 The plaintiff parties
in both Tarrant and Hugo continue to challenge these rulings in the court
system and, alternatively, are hopeful to negotiate a water purchase
197. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982).
198. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief at 3, City
of Hugo v. Nichols, 2010 WL 1816345 (E.D. Okla. June 2, 2009) (No. 608CV00303), 2009
WL 2860900.
199. City of Irving, Texas’s First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment &
Injunctive Relief, supra note 2, at 6.
200. J. BRENT CLARK, SOONER CENTURY: 100 GLORIOUS YEARS OF OKLAHOMA
FOOTBALL 34 (1995).
201. 656 F.3d 1222, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011). In Tarrant, a Texas regional water district
directly applied to the Board for three permits to appropriate water in Oklahoma for use in
Texas. Id. at 1227. In addition, it simultaneously brought suit against the Board alleging that
the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce and that Congress did not authorize
Oklahoma in the Compact to enact such laws. Id.
202. Id. at 1239.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

380

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:351

agreement with Oklahoma officials outside the courtroom.203 But if the
State of Oklahoma remains unwilling to sell water across the border or the
court system does not correct the Tenth Circuit’s errors in Hugo and
Tarrant, municipalities in Texas will be forced to incur the extraordinary
cost of treating water in the Red River or transporting water over 250 miles
from the State of Louisiana in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences
of economic and population loss.204 This conclusion would cause harm and
missed opportunities for growth on both sides of the Red River.
Additionally, and even more broadly, these rulings could pave the way for
other water rich states to continue to irrationally hoard their abundance of
water at the expense of their thirsty neighboring states that are unable to
meet rapidly increasing demand.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to resolve the
three-way circuit court split when it denied without comment Hugo’s
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on March 19, 2012.205 The Court’s ruling
therefore upholds the 2-1 ruling by the Tenth Circuit to dismiss Hugo’s
lawsuit for lack of standing. However, the Court recently granted the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Tarrant.206 For the benefit of all parties,
the Court should properly apply the rule in Sporhase to the Red River
Compact and subsequently strike down the overly protectionist state water
statutes that clearly discriminate in interstate commerce and, therefore,
violate the Commerce Clause.
Scott M. Delaney

203. Robert Boczkiewicz, Appeals Court Rules Against Efforts to Require Oklahoma to
Sell Water Rights to Texas, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 8, 2011, http://newsok.com/article/3602046.
204. Joint Brief of All Appellants, supra note 80, at 4; see Texas Water District
Continues Legal Battle for Oklahoma Water, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Dec. 18, 2009, 2:15 PM),
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/news-846-texas-water-districtcontinues-legal-battle-for-oklahoma-water/.
205. See City of Hugo v. Buchanan, 132 S. Ct. 1744, 1745 (2012).
206. Tarrant, 656 F.3d 1222, cert. granted, 2013 WL 49810 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2013).
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